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AbstrAct: this article defends hegelian dialectics against the critique of derrida and bataille. 
this defense revolves around the fate of abstract negation in dialectical sublation. focusing 
on the lordship-bondage section of the Phenomenology of spirit, it is proposed that in the 
sublated figure of the slave there remains an absolute detachment irreducible to any capitalistic, 
‘restricted’ economy of preservation. the consequence of such a reading of sublation is that no 
move outside or beyond dialectics, no transcendent escape from the Aufhebung, is called upon in 
order to account for notions of alterity, detachment, or transformation.
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1. derridA’s critique of hegel’s mAster-slAve diAlectic
rejecting those crude and simplistic dismissals of hegel that often attach themselves 
to the name ‘anti-hegelianism’, Jacques derrida, in his essay ‘from restricted to 
general economy: A hegelianism without reserve’, decides instead to tarry with the 
gravitas of hegelian dialectics, resolving to ‘spen[d] the night with reason’1 in order 
to ultimately displace it. for this, he turns to the work of georges bataille. indeed, 
he is quick to admit that ‘all of bataille’s concepts are hegelian’ (fr, 253). but such 
is precisely the point for derrida: on the conceptual level there is no escaping hegel, 
and the conditions for any displacement of the internally rational movement of dialec-
tics will be found in another, nondialectical mode. bataille is put forward as capable 
of both prescribing and exemplifying this nondialectical mode with his own writing. 
but, as we will argue, the very idea of a nondialectical departure from the dialectical 
scene will prove to be both problematic, insofar as it so quickly slips into an ideologi-
cal valorization of a transcendent outside, and unnecessary, insofar as dialectics actu-
ally displaces itself as dialectics. by examining the hegelian Aufhebung and the difficult 
movement between abstract and dialectical negativity in the Phenomenology of  Spirit, we 
     1. Jacques derrida, ‘from restricted to general economy’, in Writing and Difference, trans. Alan bass, chi-
cago, university of chicago, 1978, p. 252. henceforth cited as fr.
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will be well-placed to assess the stakes of derrida’s subtle challenge, as well as offer our 
own defense of hegel in the process. 
however, we must first pause to inquire into the problem that instigates derrida’s at-
tempted dislocation. both derrida and bataille will focus their critique of hegel on the 
economic structure of his dialectics. that is, while it would be obviously false to deny that 
there is a persistent emphasis on negation present throughout hegel’s writings, it is derri-
da and bataille’s contention that such negation or detachment is nevertheless, in the end, 
converted into another sort of attachment, stockpiled, returned with interest, and put to 
positive and profitable use. this is a conversion that might be described as capitalistic. 
take for example the lordship-bondage section of the Phenomenology of  Spirit. Alex-
andre Kojève begins his summary of the section by highlighting the role of conscious-
ness’s desire, which is satisfied by the negation, the consumption, of the independent 
existence of the thing. through this appropriative transformation of the thing, con-
sciousness affirms its own independence by stripping the autonomy of the non-i, and 
attempts to assert in the process its identity as both für sich and an sich. yet ‘[f]or there to 
be self-consciousness, desire must therefore be directed toward a non-natural object…
desire itself ’,2 the desire to be desired by another self-consciousness, the desire for rec-
ognition. And so enters the other and the subsequent conflict that occurs as a result of 
wanting to appropriate this recognition without recognizing in return. 
the direct outcome of this antagonism is the production of two characters: the 
master, who proves his ultimate independence from natural life by his willingness to put 
his life at stake in order to free himself from all attachment, and the slave, who is unwill-
ing to detach himself from his objective mode. to summarize very briefly, the slave then 
works for the master, mediately providing him with natural goods in such a way that the 
master is able to continue to immediately, abstractly negate (consume, enjoy) them while 
also continuing to receive the recognition needed for self-consciousness. but the master’s 
initial victory is exposed as insufficient as soon as one notices that the master has not 
been recognized by an equal self-consciousness but by a slave, another thing attached to 
nature. As hegel writes, ‘what really confronts him is not an independent consciousness, 
but a dependent one…his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness’.3 further-
more, through this process of encounter, battle, and the final conclusion of labouring for 
the master, the slave is able to change his relation to this nature and actually transform 
the world around him: ‘through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural 
existence in every single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it’4
so, on the surface, the conclusion here is plain enough: the final victory lies with the 
slave who negates the master’s negation and through such a negation of negation unites 
through work the master’s detachment with his own attachment. Kojève describes this 
movement as dialectical (rather than abstract) negation: ‘it keeps and preserves the 
     2. Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel, trans. James h. nichols, Jr., ithaca, cornell uni-
versity Press, 1969, p. 5.
     3. g.w.f. hegel, Phenomenology of  Spirit, trans. A.v. miller, new york, oxford university Press, 1977, §192.
     4. ibid., §194. henceforth cited as Ps.
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overcome-entity and, for that very reason survives the fact of being overcome’.5 it would 
seem, then, that the truth of self-consciousness is this slavish preservation and overcom-
ing. And according to derrida and bataille, this movement, which they describe as the 
accruing of meaning, is not restricted to the lordship-bondage section. instead, der-
rida and bataille, following Kojève, interpret the victory of the slave as the paradigmatic 
Aufhebung of the entire dialectical project par excellence, a move present in the good in-
finite of the Science of  Logic and repeated with concluding grandeur in the moment of Ab-
solute Knowing in the Phenomenology of  Spirit. if, for Kojève, the hegelian ‘end of history 
is marked by the coming of science in the form of a book…or of absolute Knowledge 
in the world’,6 then the first writer of this book is the slave. Although the direct connec-
tion between the Aufhebung of the slave and Absolute Knowing is perhaps disingenuous 
(for the Phenomenology of  Spirit does not end with the slave, not all of its transitions and 
sublations can be explained in an identical manner, and drawing such a connection to 
Absolute Knowing risks neglecting what lies between), what is clear, for our purposes, is 
that for derrida and bataille the logic of exchange that inflects all of hegel’s dialectical 
philosophy is first revealed in the figure of the slave. 
this ‘preservation’ and ‘overcoming’ of the master’s negativity defines a ‘restricted 
economy’, an economy restricted to the reproduction of meaning, converting everything 
into productive form, into property. in this way, derrida will follow bataille in suggest-
ing that the first type of negation explored by hegel in this section, the master’s abso-
lute negation—his willingness to die and be detached—is nothing but a farce, simply a 
moment to be quickly overcome by dialectical negation. but any direct, anti-hegelian 
opposition to the dialectically negating (accumulating) slave, and thereby hegelian dia-
lectics, will necessarily fail to destabilize the position of the slave, since the slave is un-
derstood to preserve in itself such oppositional negation. we can recall hegel’s discus-
sion of limitation in the Science of  Logic, where he demonstrates how anything said to be 
beyond a limit, any external point of critique, is already presupposed and determined 
by the structure of the limit and thereby cannot properly be conceived in excess or ex-
clusion of the limit.7 
According to derrida, to the extent that there is no alternative to the slave as pre-
sented here, ‘philosophy, hegelian speculation, absolute knowledge and everything that 
they govern, and will govern endlessly in their closure, remain determinations of natu-
ral, servile and vulgar consciousness. self-consciousness is servile’ (fr 276). derrida’s 
claim here is that in hegel there is no true place for meaninglessness, no place for trans-
formation, no place for transgression, restricted as his onto-economy is to the produc-
tion of meaning. the negativity of the slave, insofar as it is always presented, never gen-
uinely risks anything. in Glas, derrida will repeat this sentiment:
when one says ‘death is’, one says ‘death is denied’; death is not insofar as one posits 
it. such is the hegelian thesis: philosophy, death’s positing, its pose…the Aufhebung 
     5. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel, p. 15. 
     6. Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of  Hegel, p. 148.
     7. g.w.f. hegel, Science of  Logic, trans. A.v. miller, Amherst, humanity books, 1969, pp. 131-132.
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is the dying away, the amortization of death. that is the concept of economy in 
general in speculative dialectics…the economic act makes familiar, proper, one’s 
own, intimate, private. the sense of property, of propriety, in general is collected 
in the oikeios...the Aufhebung [is] the economic law of the absolute reappropriation 
of absolute loss.8
the conversion of the abstract negation of the master into the dialectical negation 
of the slave is, for derrida, evidence that hegel never truly confronts negativity, never 
really thinks it, for he takes it seriously, he confronts it head-on without trembling in front of 
it; he has ‘respect for death at the very moment [he] looks directly at it’ (fr, 255). if he truly 
had thought (abstract) negativity in all its unproductive power, he would surely have 
avoided it; that is, he would have avoided systematically formalizing it, subjecting it to 
philosophical positing and its processes of recuperation. taking negativity seriously and 
approaching it philosophically always amounts to the suppression or the domestication 
of the absoluteness of its detachment. the real problem with dialectics, as derrida and 
bataille see it, is that its very structure of reappropriation denies the possibility of any 
alternative economy that would avoid such formalization, that would, instead, insist on 
an endless abstract negation that could not be sublated. from the perspective of dialec-
tics (or derrida’s picture of it), this abstract, unsublatable negation is considered an im-
possibility, while derrida considers it ‘the blind spot of hegelianism’ (fr 259). derrida 
is thus interested in employing hegelian dialectics (rather than dismissing it) in such a 
way that he is able to disrupt it and open up a space for such impossibility: a hegelian-
ism without reserve. 
2. derridA’s AlternAtive: deconstructive writing, generAl 
economy
if dialectical negativity is set up as the undisputable, all-consuming conclusion of philo-
sophical dialectics, then to get at this so-called blind-spot, to displace the weight of dia-
lectics with an alternative economy of absolute negativity, one has no choice, so says 
derrida, but to greet negativity nonphilosophically, non-seriously, nonsensically. he 
writes, ‘laughter alone exceeds dialectics and the dialectician: it bursts out only on the 
basis of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of death, what hegel 
calls abstract negativity’ (fr, 256). it is only by ‘exhausting the discourse of philosophy’ 
(fr, 252) through mimicry and other unassimilable strategies that one might rend with 
the slave’s Aufhebung. 
but a simple return to the master will, as hegel demonstrates, be insufficient inso-
far as the master was finally shown to be dependent on the slave. furthermore, derrida 
and bataille take the master to be a mere moment on the way to slavish sublation. so, 
instead, derrida invokes bataille’s concept of sovereignty, a concept in many respects 
synonymous with mastery but, because of this equivocalness, one not able to be direct-
     8. Jacques derrida, Glas, trans. John P. leavey, Jr. and richard rand, lincoln, university of nebraska 
Press, 1986, p. 133 (left-hand, hegel side of page).
cosmos And history146
ly addressed (‘taken seriously’) and inscribed into philosophy as the master had been. 
unable to directly define such sovereignty, unable to take it up directly or seriously, der-
rida ascribes to this concept meaninglessness, the rejection of the desire to be desired, 
the renunciation of recognition. the sovereign ‘laughs at the Aufhebung’ (fr, 334). 
the sovereign is said to open up a new economy of absolute difference, of a différance 
which at first looks like a difference that can be immediately grafted onto the dialecti-
cal schema, but nevertheless silently slides away, escaping the assimilation that accom-
panies recognition (the difference between difference and différance, with its silent ‘a’, is 
ineffable and thus unable to be audibly distinguished). this cut between meaning and 
non-meaning inaugurates, in place of the restricted economy, a general economy. de-
scribing how the restricted economy functions and its eventual undermining, bataille 
writes in The Accursed Share that 
the products of this wealth can be employed for productive ends only insofar as the 
living organism that is economic mankind can increase its equipment. this is not 
entirely—neither always nor indefinitely—possible. A surplus must be dissipated 
through deficit operations.9 
the general economy, on the other hand, basks in this endless dissipation, this useless 
consumption, without trying to enlarge its scope in order to prevent wastefulness. but 
as soon as these particular deficits are acknowledged, however, the restricted economy 
quickly expands to account for them. As soon as one addresses the general economy in 
discourse, it reverts back to something meaningful. 
yet, derrida will acknowledge that we must speak and that even silence and the un-
speakable can, when recognized, be put to words, uttered, and therefore sublated. the 
only solution on offer is to ‘redouble language and have recourse to ruses, to stratagems, 
to simulacra’ (fr, 262), to invent a new, deconstructive writing that ‘exceeds the logos’ (fr, 
267) and uses words to silence language. but, a problem arises insofar as we, the readers 
of derrida’s obviously philosophical article, can arguably make sense of what he is call-
ing for, a prescriptive call for a new writing of dislocation that always eludes the grasp 
of the dialectician. we can account for the double entendres, we can notice the puns, 
and ascribe to their employment certain formal characteristics. how, then, is his own 
writing ever excused from language assimilable to philosophical (hegelian) discourse? 
where is there an example of this sovereign writing, this general economy? 
Perhaps derrida’s other writings come closer to satisfying this requirement. in Glas, 
for example, another text that opposes the conservative philosopher (hegel) to the radi-
cal poet (Jean genet), the text is split into two columns, references to citations are left 
out, there is no proper beginning or ending, and the font sizes and margin spacing are 
played with in unconventional ways. does this offer an alternative to philosophical lan-
guage, a true ‘potlatch of signs’ that sacrifices stability for play? it might be true that this 
has the possibility of frustrating the reader, but it hardly counts as exceeding rational 
logos. indeed, The Glassary, a reference guide for deciphering and formalizing the dif-
     9. georges bataille, The Accursed Share, Volume 1, trans. robert hurley, new york, Zone books, 1991, p. 22.
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ficult work, was published alongside the english translation.10 And derrida himself has 
gone on to note that as time passed, he lost interest in experimenting with these particu-
lar types of formats as technology made them easier to compile and navigate: 
it was well before computers that i risked the most refractory texts in relation 
to the norms of linear writings. it would be easier for me now to do this work 
of dislocation or typographical invention—of graftings, insertions, cuttings, and 
pastings—but i am not very interested in that any more from that point of view 
and in that form. that was theorized and that was done—then … and today has 
become ordinary. so we must invent other ‘disorders’, ones that are more discreet, 
less self-congratulatory and exhibitionist.11
or, might Chora L Works, a collaboration between derrida and architect Peter eisen-
man, wherein nine squares are cut through the entire book making certain words im-
possible to read, count as a true disruption of language?12 but if we can herald this text 
or perhaps one of bataille’s pornographic novels to be texts that truly work as examples 
of sovereign writing, have we not already ascribed a discursive significance to them? if 
something was to be written that was so incomprehensible, so ‘indifferent to any pos-
sible results’ (fr, 264), it would rightly be judged as obscurantism. Assuming that such 
pure, obscurantist nonsense was possible (for could it even be recognized as writing, or 
as nonsense, or as anything at all?), then the question turns to why one should write at all 
if not to communicate some meaning. indeed, why write organized (even if rebellious) 
theoretical pieces on or in order to demonstrate sovereign writing? 
in fact, derrida and bataille might drop such treatises altogether and turn to 
hegel’s own example of a nonphilosophical, non-communicative stance that requires 
no new writing: 
the weaker can be seized and penetrated by the stronger only in so far as it 
accepts the latter and constitutes one sphere with it. Just as in the material sphere 
the weak is secured against the disproportionately strong (as a sheet hanging free 
in the air is not pierced by a musket ball…) so the wholly feeble spirit is safer from 
the strong spirit than one that stands nearer to the strong. imagine if you like 
someone quite dull-witted and ignoble, then on such a person lofty intelligence 
and nobility can make no impression. the only consistent defense against reason 
is to have no dealings with it at all.13
but against this type of naïve irrationalism, bataille writes that ‘i think this anti-intellec-
tualism accounts for that which is basically very limited and …it is only beyond knowl-
edge, and perhaps in that un-knowing which i have presented, that we can win the right 
to ignorance’.14 so, it seems that there is some proper way to oppose hegel’s restricted 
economy, a more significant way to move beyond, rather than under, philosophy. the 
     10. John P. leavey, Jr., The Glassary, lincoln, university of nebraska, 1986.
     11. Jacques derrida, Paper Machine, trans. rachel bowlby, stanford, stanford university Press, 2005, p. 25.
     12. Jacques derrida and Peter eisenman, Chora L Works, new york, monacelli Press, 1997.
     13. hegel, Science of  Logic, p. 719.
     14. georges bataille, ‘un-Knowing: laughter and tears’, trans. Annette michelson, in October, vol. 36, p. 
102; my italics.
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‘drunkenness, erotic effusion, sacrificial effusion, poetic effusion, heroic behavior, anger, 
[and] absurdity’ (fr, 256) that is present throughout bataille’s supposedly non-dialecti-
cal texts, utilized to act ‘by contagion and by mime…beyond the limits’15 in order to be 
unknowable, anonymous, and general, is, after all, still of a particular, restricted, intel-
lectual type. compared to the feeble spirit or hanging sheet, it appears that bataille and 
derrida, much to their chagrin and to the contrary of their claims of excess through 
laughter, do not cease to take philosophy quite seriously. 
furthermore, we can critique derrida’s idea of such sovereign writing or general 
economy as both messianical and fetishistic. on the one hand, derrida insists that ba-
taillean sovereignty does not amount to a new transcendent critique of hegel. to be 
sure, derrida is quick to point out that bataille’s position is atheological, ateleologi-
cal, and aneschatological. but what should we make of derrida’s repeated claims that 
‘sovereignty is totally other’ (fr, 256), that it ‘exceeds the oppositions of concepts’ (fr, 
263), that it is ‘the beyond of absolute knowledge’ (fr, 261) and that it absolves itself of 
absolute knowledge? (fr, 270). we can continue: the supposed great failure of the Auf-
hebung is that it ‘blind[s] oneself to the experience of the sacred’ (fr, 257), and ‘what is 
exceeded by sovereignty is not only the “subject” but history itself ’. (fr, 272). sovereignty 
is wholly other, excessive, the beyond, and sacred, yet we are supposed to believe that 
‘bataille is above all not a new mystic’ (fr, 272) and that sovereign writing is not com-
parable to mysticism? (fr 269) why? the fact that bataille starts by acknowledging the 
conceptual power of the hegelian enterprise before pointing to a place beyond it is an 
insufficient reason to exempt him, and derrida in his turn, from what is admitted in the 
insistence on some ineffable, pseudo-transcendent position. do not mystics also begin 
within the world before they attempt to ascend to some higher, external plane of exis-
tence? indeed, for all of derrida’s protest to the contrary, it will be the bataille of Inner 
Experience who will, after criticizing a version of mysticism he equates to ‘dogmatic ser-
vitude’, affirm what in his own words he entitles a ‘new mystical theology’ of the secret 
‘which has only the unknown as object’.16 
the promise of this unknown, this beyond, this new contraband, is, as fredric Jame-
son writes, ‘the hope on which deconstruction itself is founded, yet it is ominous enough 
that we have to go through the entire hegelian dialectic’.17 this is the messianical hope 
in some outside, some secret that will finally frustrate the immanence of dialectics and 
liberate us from philosophy, and from hegel. so, is it hegel who fears the blind spot 
or is it, rather, derrida’s so-called rebels, bataille and genet, who, in their attempt to 
completely break free of the material ‘tissue’ of the logic, cling to the promise of escha-
tological safety in pure excess? (fr, 276)18 if the latter is true, then sovereignty is not an 
     15. georges bataille, Inner Experience, trans. leslie Anne boldt, Albany, suny Press, 1988, p. 109. 
     16. bataille, Inner Experience, p. 102. ‘the new mystical theology’ is the subheading to Part four of this 
text. 
     17. fredric Jameson, Valences of  the Dialectic, new york, verso, 2009, p. 112; my italics.
     18. derrida contrasts the ‘vulgar tissue of absolute knowledge’ to ‘a vision’, a revelation. it would not be a 
leap to understand this metaphor as characterizing precisely the differences between the immanent materi-
ality of dialectical philosophy and the transcendent messianism of bataille’s non-philosophy. 
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alternative to the choice between dialectics and transcendence, but falls properly on the 
transcendent side. bataillean sovereignty ends in messianical hope. 
yet, on the other hand, derrida knows that there is no clean break, no final escape. 
he knows that the messiah upon which deconstruction’s hope is founded will always 
be coming, yet will never arrive. it is here that we can identify a fetishistic disavowal 
at work. slavoj Žižek defines the idea of the fetishistic disavowal as ‘i know, but i don’t 
want to know that i know, so i don’t know’. i know it, but i refuse to fully assume the 
consequences of this knowledge, so that i can continue acting as if i don’t know’.19 we 
must speak, but let’s not speak. derrida is aware that as soon as we define sovereign 
writing, give an example of its work, put it to work, and construct a philosophical argu-
ment defending the idea of a sovereign, general economy, that we can no longer do this 
in secret, and thus it is all in vain. sovereignty ‘risks making sense, risks agreeing to the 
reasonableness of reason, of philosophy, of hegel, who is always right, as soon as one 
opens one’s mouth in order to articulate meaning’ (fr, 263). Yet nevertheless…. there still 
remains the hope that this secret gift will not slip back into a system of exchange, that 
the potlatch will stay pure. insofar as this sovereignty is taken to be entirely irreduc-
ible to reason and philosophy, it is not too far to depict it, as Žižek has, as something to 
which derrida ‘clings to…as to an article of faith’.20 without examples to demonstrate 
such non-dialectical sovereignty, all defenses of its inherent irreducibility to dialectics 
remain fideistic. 
catherine malabou writes, ‘on the face of it, the fetish always occurs outside the 
operation of exchange, outside the market’.21 indeed, the demonetized and demateri-
alized idea of an outside, imperceptible and unthinkable, yet nevertheless held up as 
worthy of our hope and faith, is precisely the fetish that defines contemporary ideology. 
Jodi dean identifies the unique function law plays in this respect. the idea of an impos-
sible place outside of the law allows the subject to ‘think it could get what it wants were it 
not for law’s prohibition’,22 consequently transforming all impediments to this transcen-
dent fleeing into infringements and repression. with this story in mind, those subject to 
the law are able to suppress their own fear of the law, assuaging their uneasiness through 
dreams of escape. following Žižek, dean points out that, in reality, true transformation 
does not occur through ideologically fantasizing about the suspension of the law but, 
instead, through the subject’s radical identification with the law and recognition of the 
law’s own emancipatory potential, its internal short-circuits, its own negativity.23 in mal-
abou’s words, ‘it is not a question of how to escape closure but rather of how to escape 
within closure itself ’.24 
     19. slavoj Žižek, Violence, new york, verso, 2008, p. 53.
     20. slavoj Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, new york, verso, 2008, p.73.
     21. catherine malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of  Writing, new york, columbia university Press, 2010, p. 77.
     22. Jodi dean, Žižek’s Politics, new york, routledge, 2006, p. 147.
     23. dean, Žižek’s Politics, p. 164.
     24. malabou, Plasticity at the Dusk of  Writing, p. 65.
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3. two inferior hegeliAnisms
if the idea of a sovereign economy is either impotent, subsumed under dialectics as soon 
as it is defined, or messianical and fetishistic, ideologically posed to serve an escapist 
fantasy, are we then simply forced to accept the hegelianism that bataille and derrida 
wished to move beyond? on september 22, 2009, slavoj Žižek gave a lecture at the 
university at buffalo entitled ‘is it Possible to be a hegelian today?’ in this lecture he 
bemoaned the two ways this question has been answered in the affirmative. 
there is a kitsch hegelianism that simply ignores the shifting history of ideas that 
has followed in hegel’s wake. that is, in the face of post-hegelian depictions of hegel as 
the totalizing idealist par excellence, who concludes philosophy (and, moreover, history) 
with a triumphalist eradication of all alterity, transformation, or change, such ‘hegelians’ 
implicitly, if not explicitly, embrace such caricatured charges. choosing to dogmatically 
insist on the comprehensiveness of hegel’s metaphysics, as if hegelianism in the twentith 
century had not been the equivalent of what spinozism was in hegel’s own day, such a 
group simply dismisses preemptively any objections to the contrary, whether they origi-
nate from schelling or marx or Kierkegaard and deconstructionism. A bellicose hegel. 
in response to this ironically anti-philosophical dogmatism, Žižek identifies a second 
group (he identifies specifically the Pittsburgh school25) that offers an alternative, ‘deflated 
image of hegel’, a hegel stripped of his ontological commitments, stripped of the very 
logical necessity of the dialectical movement, and employed pragmatically and post-
metaphysically by a post-philosophical generation. here, hegel is understood to offer 
us a useful taxonomy of possible theoretical topics, but where his conclusions become 
problematic in the eyes of the aforementioned post-hegelian critics, his work is selec-
tively pruned, his concepts substituted, his conclusions dismissed. such ‘hegelians’ set 
out to pragmatically tweak hegel, removing the controversial, ostensibly outmoded bits 
like the Aufhebung, good infinity, the victory of the slave, and Absolute Knowing. gillan 
rose identifies the consequence of such substitutions:
in their very different ways, both the non-marxist and the marxist critiques of 
hegel attempt to drop the notion of the ‘absolute’, but, at the same time, retain 
the social import of hegel’s thought…the ‘Absolute’ is not an optional extra, as 
it were…hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute is banished or 
suppressed, if the absolute cannot be thought.26
An impoverished hegel. 
rejecting the pseudo-transcendent alternative of derrida’s bataille, are we simply 
left to choose between these two inferior hegelianisms? no, for left out of this forced 
     25. the Pittsburgh school is the name often given to the recent Analytic, pragmatic appropriation of 
hegel or hegelian motifs. such a movement, usually represented by university of Pittsburgh philosophers 
robert brandom and John mcdowell, is unique insofar as the Anglo-American philosophical tradition, 
under the influence of bertrand russell and g.e. moore, had until very recently been characterized by its 
decades-long blacklisting of anything related to hegel. for a survey of this movement see Paul redding, 
Analytic Philosophy and the Return of  Hegelian Thought, cambridge: cambridge university Press, 2007. 
     26. gillian rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, london, Athlone Press, 1981, p. 42.
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choice between an anti-philosophical and post-philosophical hegelianism, is a philosoph-
ical hegelianism, to which we must now turn.
4. Another Aufhebung 
in Dissemination, derrida names the hegelian Aufhebung, in all its forms and wherever it 
might be found, as the ‘decisive target’ toward which ‘one must focus one’s critique’.27 
where it appears with the slave, derrida understands the Aufhebung to be an overcom-
ing of the absolute risk inherent in the abstract negativity of the master. the slave turns 
the master’s negativity into a mere moment, into something temporary, by swallowing 
it up into the recuperative process of dialectical negativity. but we must interrogate this 
interpretation. 
on the one hand, there is something absolutely correct about this reading. the 
slave is initially enslaved and has a relation of pure attachment to nature, to life. but 
what follows is the Aufhebung, where the slave, by performing his duty of serving the 
master, turns the attachment he has to nature into a new relationship with his surround-
ings and ultimately negates the master’s negation. here, ‘work…is desire held in check, 
fleetingness staved off’ (Ps, §195). the working slave earning his freedom through his 
work is the third term here, the term that unites the dependent slave and the indepen-
dent master. As far as this is dialectical negation, it does appear that abstract negation 
is no longer absolute but, instead, held together with attachment. As a worried bataille ob-
served, work promises the slave an enriched, productive position. 
but this is only one side of this Aufhebung. in the paragraphs directly preceding and 
following this passage about work, hegel outlines another outcome of enslavement. the 
slave’s situation ‘has not only this positive significance that in it the pure being-for-self 
of the service consciousness acquires an existence; it also has in contrast with its first 
moment, the negative significance of fear’ (Ps, §196). the slave, in his unwillingness to die, 
to detach, becomes intimately aware of absolute destruction. this is an existential fear, an 
‘absolute fear’. what this fear attests to is that the slave ‘does in fact contain within itself this 
truth of pure negativity and being-for-self… his whole being has been seized with dread’ 
(Ps, §194). in his awareness of his own radical finitude, the slave has been ‘unmanned, has 
trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to 
its foundations’ (Ps, §194). Although the slave was unwilling to die, his reflection on this 
very unwillingness leads to a complete detachment, an un-manning, abstract negation. the 
value of any attachment is entirely wiped out in the presence of death, ‘the absolute lord’. 
hegel makes it very clear what type of negativity he is talking about here: ‘the absolute 
melting-away of everything stable, is the simple, essential nature of self-consciousness, ab-
solute negativity’ (Ps, §194). here, hegel is not speaking, as we previously mentioned, of a 
negativity that harmoniously preserves both the slave’s initial attachment and the master’s 
detachment together in one. this absolute negativity is the pure detachment of the slave. 
Abstract negation is thus not confined to a moment nor confined to the master. 
     27. Jacques derrida, Dissemination, trans. barbara Johnson, london, Athlone Press, 1981, p. 248n53.
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what sense can we make of these two different aspects of the slave and the split 
nature of the Aufhebung he is said to represent? let us map out this relation: 
c (both c.1 and c.2) represents the Aufhebung of the slave. there are two sides to this 
Aufhebung: the productive side (c.1) which unites attachment and detachment, and the 
unproductive side (c.2) which holds up in opposition this attachment and detachment. 
for derrida, the Aufhebung represents only c.1, the slave who works and productively 
brings together both A and b. yet, the existential dread [Angst] that also afflicts the slave, 
that causes him to tremble, problematizes this one-sided reading of the Aufhebung. for 
A and b to actually be brought together, they must also be different, they must be op-
posed. so, as we see with c.2, the Aufhebung also opposes A and b to one another, and in 
so doing also opposes the productive, unifying side of itself (c.1) as well. in other words, 
the Aufhebung internally submits itself to Aufheben. the Aufhebung sublates itself and opens 
itself to self-transformation. As lisabeth during summarizes, ‘the interplay between 
‘abstract’ and ‘genuine’ or concrete negation is the very dynamic of dialectic itself ’.28 
given this account, it is no longer possible to say that the slave’s task is simply recupera-
tive, but we must also think the slave in his discordant tension. As malabou argues, ‘dia-
lectical sublation proceeds through a movement whereby, at one and the same time, it 
contracts and alienates the material on which it acts’.29 the Aufhebung is not simply the one 
that brings together the one and the multiple, but also the multiple that holds apart the 
one and the multiple; it is the identity of non-identity and identity and the non-identity 
of identity and non-identity. in Jameson’s words, ‘dialectics are dialectical’.30 
betrayed by derrida’s conception of the Aufhebung are his unconscious attempts to 
contain it, to corner it as something essentially productive. by depicting it as simply 
accumulative, admitting no alterity, he is able to suggest sovereignty as its overflow, 
that which bursts open the gasket of self-enclosed dialectics. in this way, he ignores the 
     28. lisabeth during ‘hegel’s critique of transcendence’, Man and World, vol. 21, 1988, p. 302.
     29. malabou, The Future of  Hegel, trans. lisabeth during, new york, routledge, 2005, p. 146.
     30. Jameson, Valences of  the Dialectic, p. 35.
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dreadful, self-destructive side of dialectics and, ironically, puts the concept of the Aufhe-
bung to work toward the end of producing an escape, a beyond. but the Aufhebung already 
destabilizes itself and tears itself apart; it is already a self-diremption. this self-destruc-
tion, the infernal melting-away of itself, immanently disrupts the restricted economy 
that only serves to preserve life and meaning. And it does this without the need of sov-
ereignty, without absconding to someplace outside of itself. instead, here we have, in a 
phrase, ‘alterity without transcendence’.31 Against derrida, ‘the dialectic is, on the con-
trary, that the very moment in which the system confirms its structure as a closure—
or in other words, it reidentifies itself as a philosophy (and thus necessarily a closed 
system)—it also reopens itself and begins all over again’.32 the self-transformation of the 
Aufhebung, its ‘self-sundering’ and ‘letting-go’ (Ps, §796) marks the ability of philosophy, 
of dialectics, to change and shift its own form from within, without retreating into pure, 
wholly other formlessness. Philosophy posits its findings, but not without also turning 
on itself to shake the very foundations that allow for this positing. but all of this remains 
within the movement of philosophy. 
to conclude, we can fully agree with derrida that ‘the hegelian concept of Aufhe-
bung represents the victory of the slave’ (fr, 275), yet with the necessary caveat that we 
recognize that this slave is a slave who works and experiences dread and that his ‘vic-
tory’ is understood, as hegel instructs, in the light of its positive (productive) and nega-
tive (destructive) significance. bataille and derrida have a narrow view of the Aufhebung, 
yet they do us the service of highlighting the abstract negativity of the Aufhebung itself. in 
fact, while derrida says that bataille is less hegelian than he thinks he is, perhaps at this 
point we might say that derrida and bataille are both more hegelian than they think 
they are. And with this account of the Aufhebung, we are, furthermore, no longer com-
mitted to either of the inferior hegelianisms that Žižek had identified. by understand-
ing that the Aufhebung sublates itself, we can promptly retire any dogmatic defense of a 
dialectics that is unable to transform itself and which thus has no way of responding to 
post-hegelian criticisms because it cannot account for alterity internal to its metaphysi-
cal closure. And, finally, the interpretation of the slave presented here also deems ob-
solete any imperative to look elsewhere and develop a pseudo-hegelian, Aufhebung-less 
dialectics in order to open up a space for abstract negation, as Adorno, among others, 
have attempted.33 A truly philosophical hegelianism, which takes the time to read what 
hegel says about the slave, will be one confident enough to ‘refuse the old ideological 
paradigm of closed versus open systems, a cold war invention if there ever was one’.34 
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